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resident, 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In determining the proper measure of damages for converted 
goods with a widely fluctuating market value, Utah courts have 
adopted the "New York rule." Under the New York rule, damages are 
fixed at the highest market price the converted good reach at any 
time between the time the injured party has notice of the 
conversion and a "reasonable time" thereafter. The trial court in 
this case committed error in ruling as a matter of law that 90 days 
constituted a reasonable time in which to fix plaintiff's damages 
under the facts of this case. 
Plaintiff relies on an assortment of irrelevant facts to 
support her assertion that she should be allowed at least 90 days 
from notice of the conversion of her stock to have her damages 
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fixed. For purposes of the cross motions for partial summary 
judgment, defendants assumed, arguendo, the following critical 
undisputed facts: 
1. On or about May 4, 1988, plaintifffs stock was converted; 
2. The act of conversion was committed by defendants Atlas 
and Check Rite; and 
3. Plaintiff had notice of the conversion of her stock on or 
about May 4, 1988. 
Many of the facts relied upon by plaintiff in her motion for 
partial summary judgment were either in dispute or were immaterial 
to the fixing of her damages, if any, proximately caused by the 
conversion of plaintiff's stock by defendants Atlas and Check Rite. 
Under the undisputed material facts of this case, plaintiff, as a 
matter of law, should be given no more than 30 days to either have 
mitigated her damages by purchasing replacement shares or have her 
damages fixed at that point in time in accordance with the under 
the New York rule. 
Defendants properly raised several evidentiary objections to 
the affidavits submitted by plaintiff in support of her cross 
motion for partial summary judgment. Since the trial court 
improperly refused to strike certain portions of the affidavits of 
plaintiff, Chuck Burton, Potter Investment, and Penny Grace, the 
trial court's ruling granting partial summary judgment in favor of 
plaintiff based upon those affidavits should be reversed. 
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Plaintiff asserts that the trial court's award of attorney's 
fees should be affirmed because they were awarded as consequential 
damages, rather than as sanctions under Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-27-56. 
Well-established Utah law provides that as a general rule, 
attorney's fees may not be awarded absent a contractual or 
statutory basis therefor. The "third-party tort rule," adopted in 
South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
does not support the award of attorney's fees in this case. 
Plaintiff's amended complaint claimed that she was only entitled to 
an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
Since the trial court made no specific findings of fact, as 
required under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, this court should reverse 
the trial court's award of attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES, AS A MATTER OF LAW, MUST 
BE FIXED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE 
OF THE ACT OF CONVERSION* 
Although plaintiff correctly points out that other 
jurisdictions have adopted varying rules for measuring damages for 
the conversion of goods with widely fluctuating values, the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the "New York rule" in Western Securities Co. 
v. Silver King Consolidated Mining Co., 57 Utah 88, 192 P. 664 
(1920). Under the New York rule, a party is entitled only to 
recover the highest value her stock reached within a "reasonable 
time" of her learning of the conversion of her stock. Since the 
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adoption of the New York rule by the Utah Supreme Court in Western 
Securities, no Utah appellate court has questioned the continued 
viability of the New York rule as the proper test for fixing 
damages in a case such as the instant case. Furthermore, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Nephi Processing Plant, Inc. v. 
Talbott, 247 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1957), also recognized the 
continued viability of the New York rule in Utah. 
Plaintiff admits that the numerous cases cited by defendants 
in their initial brief establish that time periods of 30 days or 
less may be considered "a reasonable time11 for fixing damages under 
the New York rule. However, plaintiff points to several "facts" in 
support of her claims that the New York rule is either inapplicable 
or that she should be allowed at least 90 days from her notice of 
defendants1 conversion to have her damages fixed. 
Plaintiff first asserts that the trial court's ruling should 
be affirmed because the defendants knowingly and intentionally 
converted her stock. Defendants respectfully point out that the 
tort of conversion, such as is alleged in counts I and II of 
plaintiff's amended complaint, is by its very definition an 
intentional tort. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A (1965) 
defines conversion as: 
(1) Conversion is an intentional exercise of 
dominion or control over a chattel which 
so seriously interferes with the right 
of another to control it that the actor-
may justly be required to pay the other 
the full value of the chattel. 
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The authors of the Restatement of Torts further clearly provided 
that conversion cannot be committed through mere negligence: 
One who does not intentionally exercise 
dominion or control over a chattel is not 
liable for a conversion even though his act or 
omission is negligent. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 224 (1965). Since conversion is 
always an intentional tort, the distinction which plaintiff 
attempts to draw between this case and those cited by defendants is 
a distinction without a difference. 
Plaintiff next asserts that her damages should be fixed 90 
days after she learned of the conversion because the defendants 
failed to immediately remedy the conversion despite their knowledge 
that her stock was increasing in value. Such factors were present 
in each of the cases cited by defendants in their initial brief. 
Since each of the cited cases involved a conversion by one with a 
general working knowledge of the securities market, it can be 
safely assumed that all such tortfeasors know that the value of 
converted stock might fluctuate. Furthermore, it should be pointed 
out that plaintiff's affidavits, at most, establish that Old 
Republic knew that the Check Rite stock was likely to fluctuate in 
value. It is undisputed that Old Republic did not convert 
plaintiff's stock. As a result, any knowledge held by Old Republic 
concerning the fluctuating value of Check Rite's stock is 
irrelevant to the application of the New York rule in this case. 
Plaintiff also asserts that this case is distinguishable from 
those cited in defendants' initial brief because this case involves 
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a surety bond. The presence or absence of a lost instruments bond 
is irrelevant to an action brought by the rightful holder of a 
stock certificate against a party accused of converting the 
holder's stock certificate. Although Old Republic, through its 
predecessor in interest, issued a lost instruments bond on behalf 
of defendants Scott Fletcher, Atlas and Check Rite, the subject 
bond in no way excuses plaintiff's duty to mitigate her damages nor 
obviates the applicability of the New York rule in this case. 
In addition, plaintiff asserts that the New York rule is 
inapplicable because plaintiff's stock was not converted in a "sale 
in the market" of her stock. The critical issue in this case is 
not the manner in which the act of conversion was committed by 
several of the defendants, but rather that a conversion of goods 
having a widely fluctuating value occurred. The fact that Check 
Rite shares are not traded on the New York Stock Exchange and that 
the shares were not converted in some type of a transactional 
purchase or sale is irrelevant to the determination of what 
constitutes a reasonable time in which to fix plaintiff's damages 
under the New York rule. 
Finally, plaintiff asserts that she should be permitted at 
least 90 days in which to have her damages fixed since she had no 
subjective intent and no resources to go into the open marketplace 
to purchase replacement shares. The law places a duty to mitigate 
upon every injured party. An aggrieved party's subjective intent 
or inability to mitigate should not be controlling factors in 
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determining when damages should be fixed in a case where goods with 
a widely fluctuating value have been converted. Indeed, the New 
York rule has been carefully crafted to obviate the need to refer 
to the injured party's subjective intent or ability to purchase 
replacement shares. 
Defendants respectfully submit that plaintiff should not be 
allowed to rely upon alleged "lulling" and "stalling" activities of 
a third party, such as Old Republic, which did not participate in 
the act of conversion in order to recover higher damages against 
those parties which converted plaintiff's stock. The only conduct 
in this case which is relevant to the determination of when to fix 
plaintiff's damages is the conduct engaged in by defendants Atlas 
and Check Rite in allegedly failing to transfer plaintiff's shares 
on or about May 4, 1988. Since plaintiff had knowledge of the 
conversion on or about May 4, 1988, her damages should be fixed 
within a "reasonable time" thereafter. Defendants submit that the 
trial court erred in failing to hold that 30 days constitutes a 
reasonable time in which to fix plaintiff's damages under the New 
York rule. 
POINT II. 
THE AFFIDAVITS UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF RELIED IN 
HER CROSS MOTION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN STRICKEN• 
Plaintiff asserts that defendants' motion to strike portions 
of the affidavits of plaintiff, Chuck Burton, Potter Investment, 
and Penny Grace, was properly denied because defendants failed to 
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indicate why said affidavits were objectionable. At the time of 
the hearing for the cross motions for partial summary judgment, 
defendants submitted a written memorandum detailing why said 
affidavits failed to comport with Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P. (R. 428-
431) Although Judge Uno did not allow oral argument on defendants1 
motion to strike, counsel specifically requested that Judge Uno 
take into consideration the pending motion to strike when ruling on 
the parties' cross motions for partial summary judgment. (R. 646) 
Plaintiff's affidavit of February 13, 1990, contains facts not 
supported by adequate foundation and impermissible opinion and 
legal conclusions drawn by a layman. (R. 389-392) In paragraph 2 
of her affidavit, plaintiff impermissibly concludes that she was 
"mistreated, misled, and lulled" by certain of the defendants. In 
paragraph 3, plaintiff speculates "that she would have received the 
highest price that such stock reached in 1988." In paragraph 4, 
plaintiff opines that she "believes that the defendants . . . had 
a duty to make her whole." Paragraph 5 of the affidavit is replete 
with unsubstantiated facts and opinions. Paragraph 6 of the 
affidavit contains impermissible opinions and legal conclusions 
concerning plaintiff's duty to mitigate. 
Plaintiff's second affidavit, which was submitted in 
opposition to defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, is 
likewise defective. (R. 413-416) In fact, this affidavit consists 
of nothing more than legal argument of counsel put in the form of 
an affidavit signed by the plaintiff. The affidavit deals with the 
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parties' respective duties under the law and the plaintiff's own 
opinions that she acted reasonably and that the defendants did not. 
The affidavit of Chuck Burton sets forth hearsay evidence of 
what plaintiff allegedly told Mr. Burton during a telephone 
conversation in July, 1988. (R. 379-80) Furthermore, Mr. Burton's 
affidavit lacks any foundation concerning the alleged transaction 
involving Check Rite stock referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 of his 
affidavit. Mr. Burton's affidavit also fails to clearly set forth 
the foundational basis for which he claims to have personal 
knowledge of said transaction. 
The affidavit of George Potter on behalf of Potter Investment 
Company was likewise defective. (R. 381-83) Mr. Potter opines 
without foundation in paragraph 2 of his affidavit that Check Rite 
stock certificate No. 258 had been properly endorsed by defendant 
Scott Fletcher and that plaintiff had tendered valuable 
consideration for said shares of stock. Such factual assertions 
also amount to impermissible legal conclusions. Paragraph 3 of Mr. 
Potter's affidavit likewise contains hearsay evidence and lacks 
sufficient foundation for the introduction of the facts set forth 
therein. 
Finally, the affidavit of Penny Grace fails to set forth that 
she is authorized on behalf of the Thomson McKinnon Securities 
Company to render the affidavit. (R. 387-388) Likewise, Ms. 
Grace's affidavit fails to set forth any evidence of the price at 
which Check Rite stock could be sold. In addition, evidence as to 
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the price Ms. Grace was required to pay for Check Rite stock is 
irrelevant to the issues in this case. 
In view of the deficiencies in the affidavits submitted by 
plaintiff in support of her cross motion for partial summary 
judgment, the trial court should have stricken the affidavits in 
conformity with Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P. Since the trial court granted 
partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff in part based 
upon the affidavits submitted by her, this court should reverse the 
entry of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
POINT III. 
DEFENDANTS1 ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE AWARD OP 
ATTORNEY'S FEE WAS PROPERLY RAISED IN THE 
COURT BELOW. 
Plaintiff asserts that the defendants are claiming for the 
first time on appeal that the attorney's fees awarded to her 
constitute sanctions under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Plaintiff 
asserts, without any support in the record, that the lower court 
"based its award of attorney's fees on South Sanpitch Company v. 
Pack, 765 P.2d 1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Nephi Processing 
Plant, Inc. v. Talbott, 247 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1957)." 
(Plaintiff's Opposing Brief at p. 23.) Plaintiff's argument, 
however, misses the mark. 
Defendants have consistently maintained from the time the 
trial court first considered the parties' cross motions for summary 
judgment that Utah law does not permit attorney's fees to be 
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awarded to the prevailing party unless such fees are provided for 
by contract or statute. (R. 448) 
Plaintiff's prayer for judgment against the various defendants 
in her amended complaint states in pertinent part: 
On counts I and II of Plaintiff's complaint, 
Plaintiff prays for judgment against 
defendants Atlas and Check Rite in the amount 
of the highest price of the stock since May, 
1988, an amount to be proven on or before 
trial in which plaintiff calculates to be at 
least $12,000, for costs, pre and post-
judgment interest at the highest legal rate, 
attorney's fees in accordance with § 78-27-56, 
Utah Code Ann. , and otherwise, and for any all 
further relief as the court deems fair and 
equitable . . . . 
The prayer of plaintiff's complaint clearly sets forth the sole 
basis for plaintiff's claim for an award of attorney's fees in this 
case. 
Although plaintiff urged the trial court that South Sanpitch 
Co. v. Pack and Nephi Processing Plant v. Talbott provide a basis 
for an award of attorney's fees in this case, defendants 
respectfully submit that the cases do not support the award made by 
the trial court in this case. In Nephi Processing Plant, there is 
absolutely no mention or discussion of attorney's fees as an 
element of damages. In addition, the Nephi Processing Plant 
opinion deals with the measure of damages in a case involving 
breach of warranty. In South Sanpitch Co., the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the general rule that an award of attorney's fees is not 
appropriate unless provided for by statute or contract, but created 
a narrow exception commonly referred to as the "third-party tort 
rule." South Sanpitch Co., 765 P.2d at 1282-83. The third-party 
tort rule permits the recovery of attorney's fees as an element of 
consequential damages "when the natural consequence of one's 
negligence is another's involvement in a dispute with a third 
party." icL at 1282. Under counts I and II of plaintiff's amended 
complaint, plaintiff seeks direct recovery against defendants Atlas 
and Check Rite for damages flowing from said defendants' alleged 
intentional conduct. In a direct action by one claiming that her 
goods have been converted by the named defendants, the third-party 
tort rule is inapplicable. 
In view of the wording of the prayer of plaintiff's amended 
complaint and the well-recognized general rule under Utah law, 
there is absolutely no basis for the award of attorney's fees made 
by the trial court in this case, unless the trial court intended to 
award such fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-56. However, the 
record is silent as to the trial court's reasoning behind its award 
of attorney's fees. (R. 818-19) In fact, the trial court's order 
gives no indication, let alone specific findings, as to why the 
court awarded attorney's fees in this case. Due to the lack of 
specific findings in the trial court's order and the apparent lack 
of any basis for such an award, this court should find that the 
trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to plaintiff. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon foregoing, defendants respectfully request that 
this court reverse the order granting partial summary judgment in 
favor of plaintiff on counts I and II of her amended complaint and 
order that the trial court grant defendantsf cross motion for 
partial summary judgment on counts I and II. The defendants also 
respectfully request that this court reverse or in the alternative 
vacate and remand the trial court's order granting attorneyfs fees 
to plaintiff. 
DATED this ^0 day of , 1991 
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